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Abstract
This thesis argues that the different reactions of the population and rival elites to
executive attempts to extend term limits in Rwanda and Burundi reflect the different ways civil
wars ended in these two countries. In Rwanda, a military victory resulted in institutions that
placed less constraint on the ruling party, while in Burundi, a negotiated settlement placed
comparatively greater constraints on the ruling party. As a result, the major party in Rwanda was
more powerful than the major power in Burundi, and thus more capable to co-opt or coerce the
opposition. This paper uses a most-similar case design to test the hypothesis that civil wars that
end in negotiated settlements are more likely to become unstable than a civil war that ends in a
military victory when executives attempt to extend their term limits and finds that the civil war
outcome was instrumental in explaining the divergent reactions in both countries. This paper has
important implications for those interested in post-conflict situations and executive term-limit
extensions.
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Introduction
In recent years, Africa has seen an increase in the number of executives that seek their
term limits. From 2000 to 2015, 15 African leaders attempted to extend their term limits, with
the majority of them succeeding (LeBas 2016). In Burkina Faso, President Blaise Compaoré’s
attempt to extend his term limit was met with massive public demonstrations, including setting
the National Assembly building on fire. Two dozen Burkinabe were proclaimed dead, and the
protesters marched on the presidential palace the next day, demanding the resignation of the
president. Due to the turmoil, Compaoré was forced to flee unceremoniously to the Ivory Coast
(Frére and Englebert 2015). Meanwhile, the president of the Republic of the Congo, Dennis
Sassou Nguesso, was able to successfully hold a constitutional referendum on extending his term
limits, facing little opposition in the process. Concurrently, Nigerian President Goodluck
Jonathan succeeded in getting the courts to extend his term limit, but only to hand over power
peacefully after losing an election to Muhammadu Buhari (Riedl 2015). Based on these
examples, there appears to be a large variety in the responses to term limit extensions. Why did
the president fail in the face of stiff opposition in Burkina Faso, but easily succeed in the
Republic of the Congo?
In an attempt to answer this question, this paper will focus on two recent cases in Rwanda
and Burundi. In 2015, the president of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, sought to validate his running
for a third term by forcing the country’s Supreme Court to rule that his interpretation of the
constitution was legitimate. The constitution, which was formed in 2005 after a series of
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negotiations to end a civil war, said that the president could only serve two terms
(Nkurunziza won elections in 2005 and 2010). Nkurunziza argued that because he was elected by
an indirect vote in the legislature in 2005, he could constitutionally run for another term. In the
fallout from this declaration, there were widespread protests, a failed coup, political
assassinations committed by both the government and the rebels, and a violent suppression of
civil society. The country is currently becoming increasingly unstable, as political killings and
increased ethnically charged rhetoric have increased in the absence of any political settlement in
the negotiations between the opposition and the government (UNIIB 2016). In response to the
crisis, the UN Security Council expressed “great concern” and the African Union released a
statement calling on all sides to “show restraint”.
Table 1: Selection of Attempts to Extend Term Limits in Africa and the Responses to Term
Limit Extensions
Country

Success

Response

Nigeria

Yes

Peaceful Transition

Burkina Faso

No

Overthrown

Rep. of the Congo

Yes

Little Resistance

Burundi

Yes

Widespread Unrest

Rwanda

Yes

Little Resistance

In Rwanda, the process of extending term limits progressed in a much more peaceful
manner. President Paul Kagame was able to pass a referendum on the constitution that changed
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the constitutional term limits from two seven-year terms to three seven-year terms plus two
additional five year terms, extending the time he would be able to constitutionally hold power
until 2034 (Seburanga and Gatesire 2016). However, the response to this action was the
complete opposite from what happened in Burundi. There were no violent protests or failed
coups in Rwanda. The international reaction was lackluster as well, with the US saying that
Kagame would “serve his country best by stepping down” and the EU voicing concern over the
speed at which the vote would take place. The fact that there is such a disparity in reactions to
extending term limits in these two cases, despite the two leaders attempting the same thing, poses
the question why one country spiraled into instability while the other one did not.
This paper argues that the main reason for these different outcomes in Rwanda and
Burundi was how the civil wars ended in each country. In Rwanda, there was only one party that
remained at the end of the civil war, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was able to
determine the structure of the government and the military unilaterally. As a result, it was able to
create institutions that perpetuated its rule over time. In Burundi, the civil war ended in a
negotiated settlement, which resulted in the dominant party, the National Council for the Defense
of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), not being able to fully
control government institutions, despite being the strongest party. The rigid institutions of the
peace agreement prevented the major party from completely eradicating the opposition, giving
the opposition incentive to defend the constitution and the major party incentive to disobey it.
While Rwanda and Burundi share numerous historical, cultural, ethnic, and geographic
similarities, one important distinction between them is that Burundi’s civil war in the 1990s
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ended in a negotiated settlement between the government and various rebel groups, while
Rwanda’s civil war was won unilaterally by the rebel group, the RPF. In Burundi, an
increasingly dominant party, the CNDD-FDD, has faced conflict with an increasingly
marginalized opposition, with tensions intensifying around electoral cycles and climaxing in the
current crisis. Conversely, in Rwanda, the ending of the civil war provided the RPF with the
power and the legitimacy to comprehensively shape the post conflict state. In seeking to explain
the Burundi and Rwanda cases, this paper will assess the framework of previous conflict
recurrence theories on their ability to explain the outcomes in Rwanda and Burundi. The
similarities between Rwanda and Burundi enable the use for a most-similar case design to
understand why Burundi became unstable while Rwanda did not. The similarities between the
two countries allows this paper to control for other possible causal factors, thus strengthening the
analysis.
This paper will start out with a brief discussion on the background of Burundi and
Rwanda, followed by a short summary of the literature on how civil wars affect their recurrence.
Then, it will paper will discuss the development of the post conflict states in Rwanda and
Burundi, detailing their development chronologically. Afterwards, the paper will assess how well
the various theories of conflict recurrence explain why Rwanda is stable and Burundi is not.
This will be followed by a brief discussion on the implications of the findings on power sharing
agreements, term-limit extensions, and policy choices.

4

Background
For most of its post-colonial history, Burundi was ruled by a Tutsi majority government
who ruled over the majority Hutu population, using the Tutsi controlled army as an enforcer.
Burundi saw widespread ethnic violence in 1972 and 1988. In 1993, after pressure from the
international community to democratize, then President Pierre Buyoya agreed to hold elections,
which was won by Hutu Melchior Ndadaye. Ndadye was assassinated shortly after assuming
office by the Tutsi army, which was afraid of losing its position of privilege. The Burundi Civil
War began in 1993 with widespread communal and ethnic killings following the killing of Hutu
President Melchior Ndadaye. Following the underwhelming negotiations between Ndadaye’s
primarily Hutu party FRODEBU and the Tutsi power brokers in the army, the CNDD split from
FRODEBU and took to the bush to achieve its means through armed insurgency in 1994.
FRODEBU limped on as the major party in government, but the majority Tutsi army
progressively took command of the government, culminating in a coup in 1996. Shortly after its
break with FRODEBU, the CNDD quickly established itself as the dominate rebel group. The
CNDD joined Palipehutu-FNL as the two primary Hutu combatants during the war, both fighting
the Tutsi dominated army. However, strained relationships, occasionally breaking out into overt
conflict, characterized the relationship between the two major Hutu insurgencies. Early on in its
tenure, the CNDD was rife with internal power struggles, which eventually precipitated the
creation of a new, more militant group, the CNDD-FDD. The CNDD still remains as a marginal
political party under the leadership of its original leader, Leonard Nyangoma.
The death of President Melchior Ndadaye and his close confidants left a severe power
vacuum within the government. The resulting infighting and general ineffectiveness towards the
5

Table 2: Most Similar Systems Design and Explaining Different Political Outcomes

Determinate of Civil War

Rwanda

Burundi

Ethnic Makeup

85% Hutu,
14% Tutsi
1% Twa

85% Hutu,
14% Tutsi
1% Twa

Germany followed by
Belgium

Germany followed by
Belgium

Yes (1959, 1994)

Yes (1972, 1988,1993)

Rural Agrarian

Rural Agrarian

Hilly Grasslands

Hilly Grasslands

Civil War End

Rebel Victory

Negotiated Settlement

Political Outcome

Extended Presidential Term
with Stability

Extended Presidential Term
without Stability

(Denny and Walter 2014)

Colony
(Blanton, Mason and Athow 2001)

Previous Conflict
(Fortna 2004)

Economy
(Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Söderbom 2011)

Geography
(Fearon and Laitin 2003)

massive problems facing the country left the army in control of most state institutions still in
operation. Following this disorder, former Tutsi president Pierre Buyoya, who previously lost
power in the 1993 elections, took back power from the transition government in a coup in 1996
6

(Wolpe 2011, 13). This act was met by an embargo by Burundi’s neighbors, prompting the new
regime to engage in negotiations with the opposition, which formally included FRODEBU but
also included clandestine talks with the CNDD-FDD.
Formal negotiations to end the civil war began in 1998 in Arusha, Tanzania. The talks
pitted the Buyoua’s UPRONA government and smaller Tutsi parties (known as G10) against the
FRODEBU opposition and smaller Hutu parties (known as G7). Notably, this phase of the
negotiations excluded the CNDD-FDD and the FNL (Wolpe 2011, 46). The early period of
negotiations was under the direction of Tanzanian statesman Julius Nyerere and was mired by
several problems, such as questions of trust in-between the parties, the impartiality of the
Tanzanian mediators (many Hutu refugees were in Tanzania), and the inclusion of smaller
parties and several other cleavages that separated the groups (Wolpe 2011, 45-48). When
Nyerere passed away in 1999 and Nelson Mandela took control of the negotiations, talks
progressed at a much quicker pace. Mandela’s inclusion affected the peace process by putting
greater pressure on the parties. Many of the parties, both Hutu and Tutsi, had serious reservations
about the peace agreement up to the day of the signing, but because of the strong international
presence at the ceremony, including the presence of Nelson Mandela and Bill Clinton, the parties
were pressured into reaching an agreement (Wolpe 2011, 55). The South Africans also played a
strong role in drafting the new agreement, which was influenced by the power sharing provisions
that were implemented in South Africa. South Africa also acted as a third-party guarantor,
providing 700 troops to implement the agreement (ACCORD 2007, 28). The South African led
African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) transitioned to a UN peacekeeping force (ONUB) before
the elections. The ONUB was subsequently scaled down after the elections in 2006 (ACCORD
7

2007, 32) The new Arusha Accord agreement mandated that Buyoya (UPRONA) would be
president of the transition government for half of its mandate, followed by Domitien Ndayizeye
(FRODEBU) for the second half, which was carried out successfully. The CNDD-FDD entered
into negotiations in 2002, and ultimately signed an agreement with the government in 2003. The
FNL carried on its insurgency until it signed a peace agreement with the CNDD-FDD led
government in 2006.
This new agreement set out a regiment of rigid power sharing institutions based on
ethnicity. The president was mandated to have two vice presidents, one Tutsi and one Hutu. The
legislature was divided on a 60% Hutu to 40% Tutsi. Additionally, the security forces also
underwent reform. The army’s upper echelon was to consist of 60% former army officers and
40% CNDD-FDD members. The lower level police force’s officers was to observe a 65%-35%
army-to-CNDD-FDD quota. Throughout the lower levels of the security apparatus, a 50-50
Hutu-Tutsi split was to be implemented (Samii 2014).
For most of its post-colonial history, Rwanda was dominated by a Hutu government after
its Belgian colonial masters ended their support for the Tutsi monarchy that previously ruled the
country. In the early 1960’s sporadic attacks launched by increasingly marginalized Tutsis in
Burundi and Uganda against the now Hutu dominated government prompted increased
oppression towards Rwanda’s Tutsi population. In response to this violence, approximately
200,000 Tutsis left Rwanda as refugees. The refugees that left Rwanda and fled into Uganda
later became principal supporters of Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA),
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which took control of Uganda in the 1980’s. Many of the leaders that formed the core of the
RPF, including Paul Kagame, began their military careers as military officers in the NRA.
Rwanda’s civil war started in 1990 with the invasion of the RPF from Uganda. After
setbacks in 1991 and 1992 where the insurgency was largely contained, the RPF launched an
invasion that marched all the way to the outskirts of the capital, Kigali, before it was stopped by
international intervention. This greatly intensified the pressure on President Habyarimana. He
faced the dual pressures of his Hutu allies that were poised to lose power in a negotiated
settlement, and the international community who was pressing for a peaceful settlement. In 1993,
the government and the RPF signed a peace agreement that was brokered by the international
community. However, neither side showed much commitment towards the agreement. This was
due to the increasing strength of the Hutu extremists within the government and the reluctance of
the RPF to compromise, knowing they were the stronger side. The assassination of President
Habyarimana in 1994 paved the way for “Hutu Power” extremists to take control of the
government and provided the spark for the genocide in early 1994 (Mamdami 2001, 216). In
1994, the RPF managed to defeat government and militia forces and stop the ongoing genocide,
therefore taking control of the state and its future. When the RPF took Kigali and rooted out the
génocidaires, the RPF found itself inside of a torn apart country with sparse support from any
group within Rwanda. In addition to the genocide that left 1 million dead, there were 3 million
refugees, 2 million abroad and 1 million internally displaced out of a pre-war population of 7.8
million (Reyntjens 2004). There were massive crop failures, devastating Rwanda’s primarily
agricultural economy. The previous regime had withdrawn all funds from the banks in the
process of fleeing to Zaire, and everything looted had been taken already (Reed 1995). While
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these factors hobbled the RPF in the immediate aftermath of the war, it also enabled the RPF to
reconstruct Rwanda in its own image by creating new institutions. The RPF was able to mold the
government and the military in its image. As this paper will show later, the RPF created
institutions that gave the semblance of power-sharing, but really installed control in the hands of
a small RPF/Tutsi elite.
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Theories of Civil War Recurrence
How a conflict ends has critical implications towards the probability that it recurs. In this
paper, conflict recurrence is broadly defined as “the resumption of conflict after a given peace
spell”. This broad definition has been used by other researchers looking at the length of peace
after civil war (Mason et al. 2011, Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). It is important to note that while
the current situation in Burundi cannot be classified as a civil war, the events that unfolded in
Burundi in 2015 fall on a spectrum of violence. While it may not have met the formal definition
of a “civil war” used by political scientists, the total collapse of the peace agreement and the
ensuing violence that killed hundreds surely do not signify a “peace”.
Scholars of conflict recurrence have suggested that factors relating to economic
conditions, how the war ended, level of democracy, security sector reform, third party
intervention, and power-sharing arrangements all have an effect on if a civil war will recur. First,
economic conditions can have an effect on the recurrence of conflict, with the poorer a country
is, the more likely conflict will recur there (Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Söderbom 2011). In
2015, Burundi GDP per capita was approximately 300 US dollars in 2015, compared to
Rwanda’s $700 GDP per capita. In 2014, Burundi’s GDP growth rate was approximately 4.6%,
while Rwanda’s GDP growth rate was 7.6 in 2014 (World Bank 2016). Another factor
mentioned in the literature is that when countries don’t have security guarantees from third party
actors, it is difficult to implement negotiated settlements (Walter 2002, Fortna 2004). When the
civil war ended in Burundi in 2005, Burundi received a third-party intervention in the South
African military to watch over elections. Rwanda had no third party intervention after the RPF
won the civil war in 1994. Scholars have also theorized that the level of democratization in a
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post-conflict country can also affect the chance for a civil war breaking out again, with countries
that are more democratic being less likely to have conflict recur (Walter 2015). In 2014,
Freedom House ranked Burundi as being “partly free” and Rwanda as being “not free” (Freedom
House 2014).
Another major focus in the literature regarding conflict recurrence is how a civil war ends
effects the chance of it recurring. Some of the literature has theorized that civil wars that end in
negotiated settlements are more likely to recur than civil wars that end in a rebel victory
(Licklider 1995, Werner 1999, Toft 2010). One reason for this finding is that when a single actor
wins, either the government or the rebel group, that party has the option of forcefully
demobilizing the other party by force, preventing the onset of a new civil war for the near future.
In contrast, negotiated settlements are likely to contribute to the restart of a civil war for several
reasons. One is that civil wars that end in negotiated settlements leaves no one side fully satisfied
with the outcome (Werner 1999). Settled civil wars also can create veto blocks that can prevent
the government from carrying out its wishes (Licklider 1995, 685). Another problem is that
negotiated settlements leave the organizational capacity of all actors intact, leaving the
possibility of armed conflict becoming reignited if any party feels dissatisfied with the
implementation of the peace treaty (Toft 2010, 15). Ethnic civil wars ended by a negotiated
settlement likely to fail because they leave a group’s organizational structure intact (Downs
2004).
While there is a body of literature that states that military victories lead to more stable
outcomes, there is also a large body of research that explains how to make negotiated settlements
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more robust. Two of the most widely cited factors that are credited to improving the vitality of
negotiated settlements are (1) power sharing agreements and (2) third-party peacekeeping
arrangements (Quinn and Mason 2007, Fortna 2004, DeRouen, Lea, Wallensteen 2009, Walter
2001). One theory states that power sharing agreements that divide power between combatants in
key sectors of the government, like the military and the executive, can be helpful because they
provide institutional safeguards for the parties (Hartzell 1999, 18). Other researchers have found
that third party peacekeeping arrangements are helpful because they ensure that these power
sharing agreements are implemented (Walter 2002). Similarly, scholars have also theorized that
power-sharing institutions will foster democracy, which will in turn result in a more substantial
peace. Burundi’s post-civil war environment possessed these elements, with power sharing
agreements in several key sectors as discussed above, and a strong third party in South Africa
that made sure the power sharing arrangements were implemented.
One of the principal mechanisms that scholars suggest makes democratic power sharing
useful for government stability is that power sharing institutions give smaller actors a part in the
decision-making process and check possible government abuses (Graham, Miller, and Strom
2017). However, the inverse of this can play a factor. In the case of Burundi, the dominant party,
the CNDD-FDD was somewhat constrained by opposition parties due to provisions in the
constitution. While studies on power-sharing discuss the incentives for smaller parties to adhere
to power sharing agreements, they neglect the incentives for a major party to undermine such
arrangements. If President Nkurunziza felt that the CNDD-FDD’s was greater than what was
institutionally allocated, then it makes sense that the CNDD-FDD and Nkurunziza would show a
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disregard for democratic norms. Additionally, this would also explain why the opposition parties
are so keen for the government to adhere to the “spirit of Arusha”.
While these theories have received strong empirical support, there is a problem with
applying these theories with the Burundi and Rwanda cases. The principal problem is that the
reasoning in these theories primarily applies to civil war recurrence in the short term. These
theories mainly explain why civil wars recur or what determines the length of peace. What they
do not explain is why a long peace might fail, or conversely, what keeps a long peace going.
While these theories may help explain cases like Burundi and Rwanda immediately after the end
of the civil war, it is important to note that it has been 12 years since the end of the civil war in
Burundi and 21 years since the end of civil war in Rwanda. Civil war recurrence may play out
differently if recurrence takes place after two years or twenty years, based on conditions related
to how a settlement is implemented years down the road, change in international donor activates
and views, and other possible factors. For example, if a researcher looked at the resumption of
conflict in Burundi after the 1972 genocide using a short-term timeframe of five years, they
would not have taken into account the ethnic violence in 1988 and 1994, suggesting that the
peace spell is just a temporary occurrence and not a long term solution to systemic conflict.
Additionally, previous studies of power sharing and civil war recurrence have used primarily
quantitative methods analyzing large-N studies. While these methods may present a general
pattern of power sharing and civil war recurrence, they lack the fine-grained analysis that a case
study provides. Lastly, researchers have found that the longer a negotiated settlement lasts, the
less likely it will recur. However, Burundi became unstable 10 years after the agreement was
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first implemented. This provides the opportunity to see potential flaws in how negotiated
settlements are structured.
How could a negotiated settlement fail after a long period of time, even if its initial
implementation was successful? To answer this question, this paper will look at the regimes that
were created in Rwanda and Burundi as a result of how the war ended. Recent scholarship has
shown that when rebel groups are the victors in a civil war, they are more likely to create strong
authoritarian parties (Lyons 2016, Kumar and De Zeeuw 2008). This was the case in Rwanda,
where the RPF won a military victory and could create a monopoly on power and repress any
political opposition. Conversely, in Burundi, the war ended in a negotiated settlement between
the government and the non-violent opposition, to which the CNDD-FDD later signed on to.
Under this agreement the CNDD-FDD became the most powerful group, but not the only group
in power, contrary to the RPF in Rwanda. This created a political context where instead of an
authoritarian regime existing in the aftermath of the civil war, the CNDD-FDD was in control of
an electoral autocracy, where there is a dominant party, but other political parties can compete in
elections (Kailitz 2013). In electoral autocracies, scholars suggest that the principal party can
either co-opt or repress their rivals to maintain their rule (Magaloni 2008). However, in a postcivil war context like Burundi where tensions between the Hutu CNDD-FDD and the Tutsi/rival
Hutu FNL are high, the ability of either party to credibly commit to a strategy of co-optation
remains low (Magaloni 2008). After the third-party intervener departed, the weak institutions are
insufficient to overcome distrust resulting from the civil war between the CNDD-FDD, the FNL,
and the former Tutsi government officials. This would create a situation where the CNDD-FDD
would look to completely repress the remaining opposition and the opposition would resist to be
15

repression. Due to this, the constitutional crisis triggered by Nkurunziza seeking to extend his
term limits created a situation where the CNDD-FDD was seeking to create a monopoly in the
government while the opposition was trying to prevent its demise. Based on this discussion, we
can formulate a hypothesis.
H1: Executives who attempt to extend their term limits are more likely result in the
countries instability when that country had a civil war end in a negotiated settlement than if it
had a civil war end in a military victory.
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Civil War Outcome and Instability: Burundi
The Burundi Civil War began in 1993 with widespread communal and ethnic killings
following the killing of Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye. Following the futile negotiations
between Ndadaye’s primarily Hutu party FRODEBU and the Tutsi power brokers in the army,
the CNDD-FDD split from FRODEBU and took to the bush to achieve its means through armed
insurgency in1994. The CNDD-FDD joined Palipehutu-FNL as the two primary Hutu
combatants during the war. In 1996, former Tutsi president Pierre Buyoya took power from the
transition government in a coup (Wolpe 2011, 13).
The new power sharing constitution was approved by national referendum in 2005 with
national elections taken place later in the year, all under the watch of the 5,500 strong U.N.
mission ONUB (ACCORD 2007, 30). Despite the lack of a peace agreement with the FNL, the
elections went on relatively smoothly, with the CNDD-FDD winning an absolute majority in all
elections. The ethnic quotas outlined in the constitution were also respected by all parties. After
the elections, the only viable rival to the CNDD-FDD was FRODEBU, which underwent
significant party split in reaction to its devastating loss to the CNDD-FDD, leaving the CNDDFDD in a dominant position in the government (Reyntjens 2006, 128). Despite its victory in the
elections, the CNDD-FDD felt encased in a power sharing arrangement that it had not negotiated
itself, but had belatedly joined on later (Vandeginste 2009, 76).
As a result, between the 2005 elections and the 2010 elections, the CNDD-FDD
undertook several measures to consolidate its control over the state. One way the CNDD-FDD
tried to control the state was to intimidate opposition groups and the citizenry. These actions
manifested themselves in the CNDD-FDD mobilizing its quasi-military youth group, the
17

Imbonerakure, to intimidate local officials, sometimes with CNDD-FDD approval (HRW 2009).
Also, in 2006, the government arrested several opposition politicians on vague “coup plotting”
accusations (Curtis 2012). Another incident included arresting a member of a rival political party
and 37 of its members (HRW 2009). In the run up to the elections in 2010, the CNDD-FDD tried
to “arrange the legal and institutional context so as to make sure that it could not lose the
election” (Vandeginste 2011, 352). However, incumbent President Nkurunziza’s attempt to
manipulate the elections by packing the electoral commission (CENI) with people favorable to
him proved unsuccessful because of the various power-sharing provisions that required the
CNDD-FDD to possess a 2/3 majority in the National Assembly, which it failed to achieve
(Vandeginste 2011). Despite this, the elections in 2010 were characterized by a climate of
intimidation on the opposition and civilians by the CNDD-FDD in the weeks leading up to the
elections (HRW 2010). Burundi’s election cycle takes place with communal elections, followed
by presidential and legislative elections, all occurring in quick succession of each other in a
period of four months (HRW 2010). After the communal elections, when the opposition parties
received much less votes than they had anticipated, the FNL (who signed a peace treaty with the
government in 2009), FRODEBU, and several smaller parties joined in a collation, ADC-Ikibiri,
and boycotted the elections, citing such problems such as lack of secret ballots and voter
intimidation (HRW 2010). However, the main EU election observer declared the elections
generally free and fair. Given the option of abandoning one of its only African “success stories”
or having a possible repeat of the disastrous 1993 elections, the international community’s
response that all parties should continue in the electoral process was mild and ignored by actors
within Burundi (Vandeginste 2011). The boycotting of the elections by every party minus the
18

CNDD-FDD and Buyoya’s UPRONA party allowed the CNDD-FDD to dominate the
presidential and the legislative elections. The fallout from the 2010 elections can be seen in this
way as a precursor to the fallout of the 2015 crisis. The electoral process was followed by a
crackdown on civil society, opposition parties, and the civilian population, resulting in reports of
politically motivated violence (HRW 2010). There were also reports of former combatants from
the FNL returning to the bush to resume conflict after its leader, Agathon Rwasa, disappeared
from the country (Vandeginste 2011, 330). If the power-sharing provisions of the constitution
limited the ability of the CNDD-FDD from completely dominating the country and setting up a
one party state after the 2005 elections, then this constitutional safeguard was limited even
further following the 2010 elections. The CNDD-FDD and its satellite parties received a 4/5
majority in both the National Assembly and the Senate, nearly giving Nkurunziza the power to
alter the constitution if he so chose (Vandeginste 2011, 330). Remarkably, the ethnic provisions
of the power sharing provisions were widely respected in the government after the 2010 elections
(Vandeginste 2011). This restraint is possibly due to the decreased threat of the Tutsi army after
the integration of the armed forces. With this threat decreased, the cost of breaking the Arusha
Constitution were most likely greater than the gains to be expected from removing Tutsi’s from
the government
The Burundi electoral crisis in 2015 was not an isolated event, but the climax of a long
process that had been unfolding since 2005. The spark to the current crisis was the controversial
decision for President Nkurunzizia to run for a third term. The constitution mandated that
presidents could only serve two terms, while Nkurunziza claimed that because he was elected by
an indirect vote in the National Assembly in 2005 he was able to run for a second elected term in
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2015. The pre-election atmosphere was rife with a tense opposition to the increasingly
authoritarian CNDD-FDD (Daley and Popplewell 2015). In the run up to the 2015 elections, the
CNDD-FDD cracked down on opposition groups. The CNDD-FDD made it extremely difficult
for opposition groups to organize public meetings, passed legislation restricting the media and
public gatherings, and intimidated and harassed critics of the regime (Van Acker 2016). A new
characteristic of the 2015 campaign was the strong presence of a strong civil society and public
expression of dissatisfaction with the regime. For example, in 2014, there were popular protests
in the capital, Bujumbura, over the detention of a Burundian human rights activist (Van Ecker
2016, Jones and Wittig 2016, 207). These protests were encouraged in part because of
intensifying cleavages within the CNDD-FDD itself. An open letter signed by high ranking
CNDD-FDD members, including the president’s personal spokesman, decried Nkurunziza’s
plans to run for a third term against the spirit of the constitution (ISS 2015). Internal rifts were
also highlighted by the dismissal of the head of the National Intelligence Services and the head
of the Civil Cabinet of the Presidency, both of whom were fighters in the civil war with
Nkurunziza (ISS 2015). Much of the opposition over the third term was a result of the increasing
authoritarianism of the Nkurunziza regime. In 2014, a constitutional amendment that was
considered an affront on the “spirit of Arusha” failed in the Assembly by one vote (Daley and
Poppelwell 2016, 2). Factors like this and the increasing crack down on civil society worried
many that the CNDD-FDD was about to make Burundi a one party state.
Operating in this tense and uncertain environment, the deposed head of the National
Intelligence Services, Godefroid Niyombare, launched a coup in May of 2015 against
Nkurunziza while he was at an East African Community summit on the Burundi crisis. While it
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remains unknown if Nkurunziza had knowledge of the coup beforehand or organized it himself
to provide an opportunity to purge the government (Vandeginste 2015), the coup failed and
Nkurunziza began to purge the army (Daley and Popplewell 2016). In the aftermath of the failed
coup, the government decided to go along with the mandated electoral cycle like they had in
2005 and 2010. Like in 2010, the opposition boycotted the elections in a coalition known as
CNARED, composed of the FNL, FRODEBU, and UPRONA. This time, however, the
international community condemned the elections as being unfair. Despite this, the CNDD-FDD
won with a large majority (Jones and Wittig 2016, 208). In the fallout of the elections, the
African Union (AU) proposed to send in a stabilizing force into Burundi, but backed down as a
result from a strong negative response from the Burundi government and the uneasiness of the
AU heads of state (Jobbins and Ahitungiye 2016, 214). Currently, the EAC is attempting a
dialogue between the government and the opposition, but currently it has yielded no results
(Jobbins and Ahitungiye 2016, 215). A silver lining of the conflict so far has been that the
cleavages between the government and the opposition seem to be over political and not ethnic
issues, maintaining one of the most consistently successful goals of the 2005 constitution
(Vandeginste 2015, 632). Most grievances against the government are focused on the CNDDFDD’s and President Nkurunziza’s increasing domination of the government, and not against an
increasing Hutu hegemony within the government.
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Civil War Outcome and Stability: Rwanda
Following the end of the genocide in mid-1994, the victorious RPF wasted little time
consolidating its control over the government. When developing the post conflict state, the RPF
said that it would adhere to the Arusha Accord. The Arusha Accords was the agreement reached
in 1993 between the RPF and the ruling party, the National Revolutionary Movement for
Development (MRND), which included several power sharing agreements between the two
sides. However, this agreement failed to stop the resumption of the civil war and genocide in
1994. In reality, there was little “power sharing” in post conflict Rwanda. The RPF instituted a
new system that created a dominate executive, chaired by a RPF president and vice president,
that was hidden behind a multi-party legislature (Reyntjens 1996, 237). This arrangement stated
that if the government was unable to make the decision, the president would be able to govern in
a “sovereign way” (Reyntjens 1996, 237). Given that there needed to be a 2/3 majority to pass
legislation, the RPF took 8 of the 21 portfolios, giving it effective control over the government.
While simultaneously controlling the portfolio, the RPF also possessed a majority in the
legislature (Reyntjens 1996, 237). In addition to this, 4 of the 6 Supreme Court justices, 80% of
the mayors, and almost the entire army and intelligence service were Tutsi’s, even though Tutsis
only made up 14% of the population (Reyntjens 2004, 188).
The RPF also undertook a policy of shutting out civil society. Several civil society
groups, like the Collective of Alliances and Leagues for the Defense of Human Rights in
Rwanda (CLADHO), the Rwanda Association for the Defense of Human Rights and Civic
Liberties (ADL), and the Rwandan Association for the Defense of Human Rights (ARDHO)
were pressured by the RPF to stop shedding light on the regimes various human rights abuses.
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The ADL’s leader was killed under suspicious circumstances, ARDHO leadership was replaced
by the regime, and CLADHO, watching the events unfolding around it, decided to stop
criticizing the regime (Longman 2011, 29). While the RPF stated that it would hold up the
Arusha Accords, it quickly banned the MRND and the Collation for the Defense of the Republic
(CDR), citing that they were implicated in the genocide. While the banning of parties that were
implicated in the genocide is not controversial, the fact that the RPF took the government
positions that were allocated to the MRND shows that the RPF could have an ulterior motive of
political gain by increasing their number of government positions at the expense of a rival
(Niesen 2010, 719). In 2001, former president (who was replaced by current president, Paul
Kagame) Pasteur Bizimungu attempted to form a new political party, the Party for Democracy
and Regeneration (PDR). The RPF declared that this new party was a threat to public safety
claiming the PDR was riling up ethnic divisionism (Niesen 2010, 716). Similarly, the RPF was
able to disband the second largest party, the Republican Democratic Movement (MDR), shortly
before the 2003 parliamentary elections. The government declared that the MDR was guilty of
implementing a “divisionist” strategy. The government did this while providing little evidence,
and arresting a number of high ranking MDR politicians (Longman 2011, 33). The Rwandan
government also tightly controlled elections in this time period. The first local elections, held in
1999, were carried out in an unscrupulous manner. The fact that candidates had to campaign on
an individual basis (parties were only allowed at the national level) and that people had to use a
queuing system to vote for their preferred candidate brought into dispute whether or not the
elections were free and fair (Longman 2011, 38).

23

The practices of the RPF past 2003 can be seen as a continuation of the policies it
pursued in the past. In 2003, the new constitution was voted on and was passed by referendum
with 93% voting yes. It is important to note that not a single dissident voice was allowed to
speak out against the constitution during the campaign (Reyntjens 2004, 185). The constitution
approved in 2003 was much like the one in 1994, a document created to legitimize the regime
under the guise of “democratic governance”. President Paul Kagame was elected by 95% of the
vote in an election that was mired in irregularities and fraud at nearly every level of the electoral
process (Reyntjens 2004, 186). Up until the current date, the RPF continued its policies of
banning any credible opposition, suppression of the media, and holding unfair elections. To
regulate opposition parties, the RPF organized all opposition parties into a Forum of Political
Parties. This organization is granted the power to approve all of the candidates that political
parties put forward for parliament. This governing body is completely dominated by the RPF and
is also formalized as a constitutional body (Longman 2010, 33). The government also continued
to accuse and abuse opposition parties, harassing the Centrist Democratic Party, the Liberal Party
(PL), and the United Democratic Forces (FDU-Inkingi) among others (Longman 2010, 34). The
government justified the suppression of political parties by continuing the implementation of the
“genocide ideology” doctrine. The government’s vague interpretation of what “genocide
ideology” is gives it almost a blank check to crack down on any parties that step out of line. An
example of this “genocide ideology” being applied liberally is when the RPF banned the FDUInkingi for saying that Hutu’s were also victims in the genocide (Jones 2016). This “genocide
ideology” doctrine has also been used to stifle the media and civil society in Rwanda. The RPF
used this charge to dismantle and replace the leadership of one of Rwanda’s most vocal human
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rights groups, the Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights
(LIPRODHOR) (Beswick 2010, 240). The RPF has also been effective in using more covert
means to silence dissent, using methods such as “enforced disappearances”, threats, and
intimidations, such as in 2004 when five former high ranking MDR members disappeared
(Beswick 2010, 243). While the use of enforced disappearances has decreased in recent years,
its use has helped spread rumors of the regimes reach. This idea of RPF strength has effectively
come to have a stranglehold civil discourse, where the perception of the regime and its response
to dissidence has created an atmosphere of fear and self-censorship (Beswick 2010, 244).
Another feature of the post conflict environment of Rwanda is Rwanda’s relationship
with the international community. Despite the strong authoritarian nature of the RPF regime,
Rwanda still receives a large portion of its budget from donor money. In 2007, Rwanda received
$700 million dollars in developmental assistance from the donor community, almost matching
the funds it received after the genocide (Samset 2011, 271). One of the reasons it is seen
favorably in the eyes of the donor community can be seen as somewhat of a “guilt complex” in
the donor nations (Reyntjens 2004, 199). Rwanda also receives a high amount of donor funds
because Rwanda represents a case of “good enough democracy” that promotes stability,
technocratic governance, and high economic growth, which gives justification to overlook the
RPF’s authoritarian tendencies (Hayman 2011, 127).
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Comparative Analysis
How well does the conflict recurrence literature explain the Burundi and Rwanda cases?
In Burundi, the negotiated settlement was a major part in the process that would lead to the
current instability. Even though the settlement had several power-sharing provisions and the
support of a third-party intervention, it still failed. Part of the reason for its failure is that while a
negotiated settlement can change the structure of a government, it could not change the way
politics was conducted (Van Acker 2016, 5). The Arusha process was one in which the actors
negotiated and discussed how to share control of the state. The apparatuses of the state were then
used by leaders in neo-patrimonial ways that distributed the resources to their loyal followers.
However, because of the CNDD-FDD’s initial popularity in the post-conflict society, due to the
FNL’s absence, FRODEBU’s history of cooperation with Buyoya’s regime, and the credit it
gained for its armed struggle (Reyntjens 2005), it was able to dominate these state apparatuses
through its success in the 2005 elections and consolidate its power at the expense of the
opposition. This system repeated and intensified during the 2010 elections, and eventually
reached its zenith in 2015 where the country exploded in turmoil (Vandeginste 2015). In
addition, a negotiated settlement might exacerbate this process, not abate it. In the peace
negotiations, the concessions that parties were awarded were based on military strength. Because
of this fact, parties could use power sharing as “a way to buy time and readjust to political
circumstances” (Curtis 2012). When a party had enough strength, it could afford to “renegotiate”
the terms of the agreement not through civil discourse, but through coercive measures (Werner
1999, 929). This explanation seems to give support to the theory that elections becoming
increasingly dominated by a single party undermine the stability and democratic principles
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offered by negotiated settlements (Toft 2010). The Burundi case also suggests that power sharing
agreements and third party security guarantees may be necessary but not sufficient in securing
the long term implementation of negotiated settlements, and that the international community
(the UN, AU), needs to pay closer attention to events leading up to elections in post-conflict
settings, and not a narrow focus on election day.
In Rwanda, after the civil war, the government systematically rooted out any credible
opposition to its regime. Indeed, the RPF went through great lengths to incapacitate opposition in
the aftermath of the civil war. This can be seen in the RPF’s incursions into the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) to destroy the Interahamwe militia and displace the Hutu refugees
either further into the DRC or back into Rwanda. The RPF also brutally put down internal
insurgencies in 1997 (Reyntjens 2004, 186). Another aspect of post conflict Rwanda was the
legitimacy it received from the international community. The guilt the international community
felt from its turning a blind eye to the conflict and its desire for an “African success story” that
had a high growth rate and a seemingly inclusive government gave the RPF a longer leash to act
with impunity than most post conflict countries. In light of these reasons, the RPF’s military
victory looks like a primary reason for the current stability in Rwanda. The military victory had a
large part in the stability of Rwanda after the passing of the referendum to extend Paul Kagame’s
term limits. The process to stifle opposition parties, civil society, and credible elections that
culminated in the lack of response to the 2015 referendum was in large part set in motion by the
fact that the RPF was given the tools to design the post conflict state in its own image because of
its status of the victor. The victory won by the RPF not only enabled it to defeat opposition in the
short term, but the victory also gave the RPF the opportunity to create institutions that allowed
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the RPF to both continue its domination of the political sphere and crush opposition before it
arises.
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Alternative Explanations
Apart from the way the civil war ended, what could help explain why conflict sprung up
in Burundi and not in Rwanda in 2015? In this section, this paper will examine three alternate
explanations, focusing on economic conditions, the type of regime in each country, and the
media. While this doesn’t amount to a comprehensive review of the possible factors, like the
success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration campaigns or the effects of
transitional justice, that led up to the events of 2015, these appear to be the most obvious and
potentially significant factors that might have significantly affected the situation.
Poor economic conditions can have a negative effect on civil war recurrence. Living
conditions may influence whether or not an individual would join a rebel group. Scholars have
noted that circumstances such as poor economic conditions or openness of the government to the
decision making process, result in a higher probability for civil war recurrence (Walter 2015,
385). There is also evidence that poor economic conditions can also lower the opportunity cost
for rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 565). On the surface, an economic argument is
plausible. In 2014, the GDP per capita in Rwanda was 2.4 times higher than the GDP per captia
in Burundi, had a higher score on the Human Development Index, and had higher GDP growth
(World Bank 2016, UNDP 2014). This would suggest that the economic conditions in Rwanda
gave people little incentive to rebel against the government relative to people in Burundi.
However, a closer analysis of Rwanda determines that these figures do not tell the whole story.
Economic growth is highly centralized in the hands of the Rwandan government, leaving most
people employed in an insecure and low paying informal sector of the economy (Ansoms and
Rostagno 2012, 438). In addition to this, Rwanda’s various economic policies have left many
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youths unskilled and unemployed, possibly putting the country at risk (Ansoms and Rostagno
2012, 439). While it is obvious that Rwanda performed better economically than Burundi going
by conventional measures, the positive effect of this economic performance on the average
Rwandan is debatable, thus reducing its explanatory power. However, given the intensity of the
Rwandan genocide, it is possible that Rwandan citizens favor stability over a democratic
government, decreasing the chance that they would protest Kagame’s continued rule
While the previous analysis seems to weaken the explanatory power of a “grievance”
hypothesis, it does not take care of economic strength as an indicator of state strength. The fact
that Rwanda has a higher GDP than Burundi would indicate that the Rwandan government has a
greater amount of resources than Burundi’s government, making it more likely for conflict to
break out in Burundi (Fearon and Laitin 2003). There are some signs that this plays an important
role in these two cases. The fact that military personnel spoke against the regime could be a sign
that the Nukrunziza government lacked the capital to buy off rivals. In addition, the fact that
protesters were able to demonstrate in the streets at could be a sign of state weakness. On the
other hand, the RPF has a system where it gives funds to supporters of the regime, especially the
military (Behuria 2016). This short analysis suggests that the state capacity of the regime itself
could play a potentially powerful role in explaining the divergence in the Rwandan and Burundi
cases.
Another problem was that many of the government officials and opposition parties that
spoke out against the regime reportedly were frustrated with the lack of access to the neopatrimonial flows of government resources (Vandeginste 2015, 635). In Rwanda, the
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government doesn’t only have the capability to effectively shut out opposition (see above), but it
also has a structure to effectively co-opt potential challengers. The RPF and the military have a
large number of staple industries under their control that effectively allow them to disperse
resources efficiently to include powerful actors in the government (Behuria 2016, 14). While
more direct, this argument is not completely different from this papers main argument. As shown
in this paper, the type of government that existed in Rwanda and Burundi was in large part
derivative from the outcome of the civil war. From this perspective, the type of government that
existed in post-conflict Burundi and Rwanda may be a step in the causal chain of how civil war
termination affects civil war recurrence.
The last alternative explanation pertains to the media’s influence in Burundi as compared
to Rwanda. This paper has already detailed the role the media played in Burundi when
Nkurunziza announced his intentions to run for a third-term, where the media covered the
protests that proliferated in the aftermath of the President’s decision. This contrasts with the
nature of the media in Rwanda, where the media has recently been suppressed and largely selfcensoring (Beswick 2010). However, in recent history, the relationship between the media and
the government in Rwanda and Burundi has been characterized by a legacy derived from the
Genocide, self-censorship, and the systematic harassment of journalists (Longman 2011, Kane
and Bizimana 2016). If the development of the media in both countries seems to parallel each
other, why was the media reaction in one Burundi so different. A possible explanation is that the
Burundian government was not seen as being powerful, and that the media was emboldened by
the recent release of journalist Bob Rugurika in February 2015 after popular protests and heavy
international pressure secured his release (Frère 2016).
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All four of these alternative explanations explain the variation in reactions to the decision
of the executives to extend their term limits in 2015, but fail to undermine the argument that the
outcome of the civil wars played a central role in the divergent paths of Rwanda and Burundi.
The economic reasoning comes short on the point that common Rwandans face a similar
economic situation to common Burundians. The state capacity and government type arguments
are both potentially functions of civil war outcome, reducing their independent explanatory
power. The media argument is can also be seen as a function of civil war outcome, in that if a
civil war victory creates a stronger party that controls the government, then they will be able to
control the media effectively, where a dominate party that takes power after a negotiated
settlement would have less capacity to control the media because of institutional constraints.
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Conclusion and Future Research
In 2015, the presidents of both Rwanda and Burundi tried to extend their term limits. The
president of Rwanda was able to do this successfully with little opposition. The president of
Burundi was only able to do this in the face of stiff opposition while putting his country on the
edge of greater instability. This appears puzzling as both countries are similar in several
different ways. To solve this puzzle, this paper has attempted to show that the disparity in the
reaction to the term limits was caused by a long process that began with the ending of Rwanda
and Burundi’s civil war. The RPF’s unilateral victory in Rwanda allowed the RPF to shut out
any opposition and consolidate its hold on the state, while in the negotiated settlement in Burundi
placed the country where an increasingly marginalized opposition and civil society was in
conflict with an increasingly dominate and authoritarian CNDD-FDD. This conflict intensified
over time, especially during elections, until the CNDD-FDD appeared to be in position to totally
take control with the president’s decision to run for a third term in 2015. Economic factors have
comparatively less explanatory power when trying to unravel the puzzle of Burundi’s instability
and Rwanda’s stability. The type of regime has a strong explanatory effect on the situation, but it
can largely be seen as an aftereffect of how the conflicts ended.
Another important factor in these two cases is Rwanda and Burundi’s relationship with
the international community. In both Rwanda and Burundi, the international community has
accepted the increasingly authoritarian natures of both countries in return for purposes of
maintaining short term stability in two of Africa’s “success stories”. The Burundi case shows that
heavy involvement in the immediate aftermath of a conflict is not enough, and that the

33

international community needs to do a better job ensuring the democratic principles of a
negotiated settlement are carried out on the ground if they do not want them to fail.
In this paper, I hypothesize that civil wars that end in a negotiated settlement are more
likely to recur because the party resulting party will be weaker. Due to the major party being
weaker, their ability to coerce or co-opt potential rivals will be diminished compared to a case
where a rebel group won a civil war. Additionally, a party that takes power after a negotiated
settlement by definition has to share power with other parties whose organizational structure was
not destroyed after the civil war, meaning that there is a viable opposition to compete against the
ruling party. However, after a rebel victory, the rebel group had a greater access to resources
while also not having to compete with other political parties after the settlement. Furthermore,
negotiated settlements are most likely to break down when faced with a constitutional crisis of
some form, like an unconstitutional maintenance of power. This paper tested this theory using a
most-similar case design, using Rwanda and Burundi. The 2015 crisis was the combination of
opposition to Nkurunziza’s regime both by within CNDD-FDD opposition and other opposition
parties. These events break the already fragile bonds holding together a negotiated settlement
because they usually represent an event where the major party or dominate actor seeks to
dominate power at the expense of other actors. Events turn violent because violence is accepted
as a legitimate form of political means in post-conflict situations. In Rwanda, opposition to the
major parties rule, both within the RPF and outside it, was prevented from developing after the
civil war.
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Appendix A: List of Abbreviations

35

RPF - Rwandan Patriotic Front
CNDD-FDD - National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of
Democracy
FRODEBU – Front for Democracy in Burundi
FNL- National Forces for Liberation
AIMB - African Mission in Burundi
ONUB – United Nations Operation in Burundi
UPRONA – Union for National Progress
CENI - Independent National Electoral Commission
MNRD - National Revolutionary Movement for Development
CLADHO - Collective of Alliances and Leagues for the Defense of Human Rights in Rwanda
ADL - Rwanda Association for the Defense of Human Rights and Civic Liberties
ARDHO - Rwandan Association for the Defense of Human Rights
CDR - Collation for the Defense of the Republic
FDU-Inkingi – United Democratic Forces
PL - Liberal Party
PDR - Party for Democracy and Regeneration
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LIPRODHOR - Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights

37

References
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). 2007. “South
Africa’s Peacekeeping Role in Burundi: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Peace
Missions”.October.http://www.genevaacademy.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/Burundi.SouthAfr.
peacekeepingrole.report2007.pdf.
Amnesty International (AI). 2015. https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/burkinafaso/report-burkina-faso/. London: AI.
Ansoms, An, and Donatella Rostagno. 2012. "Rwanda's Vision 2020 Halfway Through: What
the Eye does not see." Review of African Political Economy 39(133): 427-50.
Behuria, Pritish. 2016. “Centralizing Rents and Dispersing Power while Pursuing Development?
Exploring the Strategic Uses of Military Firms in Rwanda”. Review of African Political
Economy, 13: 1-8.
Beswick, Danielle. 2010. "Managing Dissent in a Post Genocide Environment: The Challenge of
Political Space in Rwanda." Development and Change 41(2): 225-51.
Blanton, Robert, T. David Mason, and Brian Athow. 2004. "Colonial style and post-colonial
ethnic conflict in Africa." Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 4 : 473-491.
Bouka, Yolande. 2015.” President Pierre Nkurunziza Seems to be Losing Control over both the
Ruling Party and his Political Future”. Institute for Security Studies. (April 1, 2015).
Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom. 2008. "Post-Conflict Risks."Journal of Peace
Research 45(4): 461-78.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. "On Economic Causes of Civil War." Oxford economic
papers 50(4): 563-73.
Curtis, Devon. 2012. "The International Peacebuilding Paradox: Power Sharing and PostConflict Governance in Burundi." African Affairs 112(446): 72-91.
Daley, Patricia, and Rowan Popplewell. 2016. "The Appeal of Third Termism and Militarism in
Burundi." Review of African Political Economy: 44: 1-10.
Denny EK, Walter BF. 2014. “Ethnicity and Civil War”. Journal of Peace Research. Mar
1;51(2):199-212.
Downes, Alexander B. 2004. "The problem with negotiated settlements to ethnic civil
wars." Security Studies 13, no. 4 (2004): 230-279
38

Fearon, David and David D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”. American
political science review 97(01): 75-90.
Fjelde, Hanne. 2010. "Generals, Dictators, and Kings Authoritarian Regimes and Civil Conflict,
1973—2004." Conflict Management and Peace Science 27(3): 195-218.
Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. "Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the
duration of peace after civil war." International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 2: 269-292.
Frère, Marie-Soleil, and Pierre Englebert. 2015. "Briefing: Burkina Faso—the Fall of Blaise
Compaoré." African Affairs 114, no. 455: 295-307.
House, Freedom 2014. Freedom in the world 2014: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and
Civil Liberties. Rowman & Littlefield.
Hartzell, Caroline A. 1999. "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate
Wars." Journal of Conflict Resolution 43(1): 3-22.
Hartzell, Caroline, and Matthew Hoddie. 2003. "Institutionalizing peace: power sharing and
post‐civil war conflict management." American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 2:
318-332
Hayman, Rachel. 2011. “Funding Fraud? Donors and democracy in Rwanda”. In Remaking
Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights After Mass Violence, eds. Scott Straus and
Lars Waldorf. Univ of Wisconsin Press, 118-132.
Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2010. Closing Doors? “The Narrowing of Democratic Space in
Burundi”. New York: HRW.
Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2009. “Pursuit of Power Political Violence and Repression in
Burundi”. New York: HRW
Jobbins, Mike, and Floride Ahitungiye. 2015. "Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention in
Burundi’s 2015 Election Crisis." Global Summitry 1(2): 205-18.
Jones, Cara E., and Katrin Wittig. 2016. "The 2015 Legislative and Presidential Elections in
Burundi–An Unfinished Post-Conflict Transition." Electoral Studies 11: 1-10.
Kailitz, Steffen. 2013. "Classifying political regimes revisited: legitimation and
durability." Democratization 20, no. 1: 39-60.
39

Kumar, Krishna, and Jeroen De Zeeuw. 2008. "International support for political party
development in war-torn societies." Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies:
Regulation, Engineering, and Democratic Development.
LeBas, Adrienne. 2016. "Term Limits and Beyond: Africa's Democratic Hurdles." Current
History 115, no. 781: 169.
Lemarchand, René. (1994). Burundi: Ethnocide as discourse and practice. New York: Woodrow
Wilson Center Press.
Longman, Timothy. 2011. “Limitations to Political Reform: The Undemocratic Nature of
Transition in Rwanda”. In Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights After
Mass Violence, eds. Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf. Univ of Wisconsin Press, 25-48.
Lyons, Terrence. 2016. "From victorious rebels to strong authoritarian parties: prospects for
post-war democratization." Democratization23, no. 6: 1026-1041.
Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. "Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian ‘
rule." Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 4-5: 715-741.
Mamdani, Mahmood. 2001. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the
Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton University Press.
Mason, T. David, Mehmet Gurses, Patrick T. Brandt, and Jason Michael Quinn. "When civil
wars recur: Conditions for durable peace after civil wars." International Studies
Perspectives 12, no. 2 (2011): 171-189.
Niesen, Peter. 2010. "Political party bans in Rwanda 1994–2003: three narratives of
justification." Democratization 17(4): 709-29.
Reyntjens, Filip. 2004. "Rwanda, Ten Years on: From Genocide to Dictatorship." African
Affairs 103(411): 177-210.
Reyntjens, Filip. 1996. "Constitution-Making in Situations of Extreme Crisis: The Case of
Rwanda and Burundi." Journal of African Law 40(2): 234-42.
Riedl, Rachel Beatty. 2015. “Are Efforts to Limit Presidential Power in Africa Working?”
Washington Post. February 16, 2015.
Samii, Cyrus. 2013. "Perils or promise of ethnic integration? Evidence from a hard case in
40

Burundi." American Political Science Review 107, no. 3: 558-573.
Samset, Ingrid. 2011. "Building a Repressive Peace: The Case of Post-Genocide
Rwanda." Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 5(3): 265-83.
Seburanga, Jean Leonard, and Theodette Gatesire. 2016. "The 2003 and 2015 Constitutional
Referenda in Rwanda: A Significant Change in Voter Turnout." Democracy and Security
12(3): 162-182.
Toft, Monica Duffy. 2010. "Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?." International
Security 34(4): 7-36.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 2014. “Human Development Report 2014”.
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf
United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB). 2016. “Report of the United
Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB) Established Pursuant to Human
Rights Council resolution S-24/1”. September 20.
Van Acker, Tomas. 2015. “Understanding Burundi’s Predicament”. Africa Policy Briefs, 1-10.
Vandeginste, Stef. 2015. “Burundi's Electoral Crisis – Back to Power-Sharing Politics as
Usual?”. African Affairs 114(457): 624-36.
Vandeginste, Stef. 2014. "Governing Ethnicity after Genocide: Ethnic Amnesia in Rwanda
versus Ethnic Power-Sharing in Burundi." Journal of Eastern African Studies 8(2): 26377.
Vandeginste, Stef. 2011. “Power-sharing as a fragile safety valve in times of electoral turmoil:
the costs and benefits of Burundi’s 2010 elections”. Journal of Modern African
Studies, 49(2): 315-35.
Vandeginste, Stef. 2009. “Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi: Twenty Years of
Trial and Error”. Africa Spectrum, 44(3): 63-86.
Walter, Barbara F. 2015. "Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War." Journal of Conflict
Resolution 59(7): 1242-72.
Walter, Barbara F. 2002. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars.
Princeton University Press.

41

Werner, Suzanne. 1999. "The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the
Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms." American Journal of Political Science 43(3):
912-34.
Wolpe, Howard. 2011. “Making Peace after Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process”.
Peaceworks No. 70. United States Institute of Peace: Washington D.C.
World Bank. 2016. “GDP per capita (current US$)”.
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=RW-BI.
Young, Crawford. 2006. “The Heart of the African Conflict Zone: Democratization, Ethnicity,
Civil Conflict, and the Great Lakes Crisis”. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci 9: 301-28.

42

